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ABSTRACT 
 
Wage Effects of Non-Wage Labour Costs* 
 
We study short- and long-term wage effects of two important elements of non-wage labour 
costs: firing costs and payroll taxes. We exploit a reform that introduced substantial reduction 
in these two provisions for unemployed workers aged less than thirty and over forty five 
years. Theoretical insights are gained with a matching model with heterogeneous workers, 
which predicts an ambiguous effect on wages: firing costs are expected to increase wages, 
because they increase the bargaining power of workers, while the effect of payroll taxes is 
negative. Difference-in-differences estimates, which account for the endogeneity of the 
treatment status, suggest that decreased firing costs and payroll taxes have a positive overall 
short-term effect on wages – and also on unemployment. We find larger effects for older than 
for younger workers and for men than for women. Calibration and simulation of the model 
shows that about fifty percent of the predicted cumulative increase on wages takes place 
during the first year of the reform. Our simulations also show that the increase in wages is 
mostly due to the reduction in payroll taxes, while the overall effect of firing costs is nil 
because direct and indirect effects of firing costs offset each other. 
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, several European countries have reduced employment protection and
payroll taxes to improve the performance of the labour market (see Kugler (2007) for
employment protection legislation (EPL) reforms and Carone, Nicodme, and Schmidt
(2007) for recent changes in payroll taxes).1 However, the estimation and evaluation of
the causal effects of the changes has proved difficult, since most changes have been gradual
(i.e. not sharp) and accross the board (i.e. applied to everyone).
In 1997, Spain drastically reduced dismissal costs and payroll taxes for young and
old workers only, which provides a unique natural setting to examine the effects of non-
wage labour costs. Severance payments for unfair dismissals were reduced 20%, while
payroll taxes decreased between 40 and 60%, depending on the targeted group. These
sharp changes, which applied only to some age groups, provide a unique opportunity to
examine the causal effects of firing costs and payroll taxes on employment and wages.
There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence, which points that stringent em-
ployment protection regulations reduce employment flows (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab
(2004, 2006); Kugler and Pica (2003, 2008)). However, evidence on wage effects is very
scarce and not very conclusive. Leonardi and Pica (2007) analyse an increase in firing
costs implemented in Italy for small firms and find that more stringent employment pro-
tection has no effect on entry wages, but has a negative impact on subsequent wages, while
van der Wiel (2010) finds positive wage effects of extending employer’s term of notice in
the Netherlands.
The incidence of payroll taxes also gathers mixed evidence. Generally speaking, when
employees percieve a close link between employers’ contributions and their benefits, payroll
taxes are likely to be fully shifted from firms to employees, with no disemployment effects.
However, with a loose link between taxes and benefits, payroll taxes are usually not fully
passed on to employees and employment decreases.2 Small changes have also been found
easier to pass on to employees than large changes (Gruber (1997)).
1For instance, in the late 1980s France relaxed employment protection provisions to facilitate employ-
ment for certain types of workers, and Germany has recently (in 2004) exempted small firms (from 5 to
10 employees) from EPL. Payroll taxes decreased in the EU-27 from 7.5% to 7.3% of GDP between 1995
and 2005, and the Nordic countries have been reducing payroll taxes selectively for some regions since
the mid 1980s.
2This may be the case for pay-as-you-go social security systems, such as the Spanish one, with weak
linkages between pensions and other benefits, on the one hand, and contributions, on the other.
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Our analysis focusses on the wage effects of firing costs and payroll taxes, though
we also examine their implications for employment. To do so, we extent the matching
model with heterogeneous workers put forth by Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2007) in
two important ways to accomodate the salient features of the Reform. We introduce an
exogenous job retirement probability to account for the important age difference of the
targeted groups, and we also consider the joint effect of payroll taxes and firing costs.
We provide short- and long-term evidence, which yield consistent results. Short
term estimates come from a microeconometric analysis of panel individual administrative
records, while longer-term evidence results from calibrating the model and simulating the
reform.
We exploit the variation of firing costs and payroll taxes across age groups (young,
prime-age, and older) and over time (before and after 1997), and identify the effects of
the reform using a difference-in-differences estimator, i.e. we compare wages of younger
and older individuals with those of prime-age individuals, before and after the reform.
Our main findings suggest that decreased firing costs and payroll taxes have a positive
effect on wages and employment. Simulations show that about 50 percent of the predicted
cumulative wage increase takes place during the first year of the reform. This partial
transmission of the adjustment in non-wage labour costs occurs because the reform applied
only to newly signed permanent contracts, which is the effect captured by our short-term
estimates, whereas simulations show the effect that would obtain if all employed workers
in the treatment groups were affected by the reform. Simulations also show that the
increase in wages is mostly due to the reduction in the payroll tax.
The experience of Spain should also provide direct evidence on the effects other coun-
tries might expect from a decision to promote (permanent) employment by reducing
non-wage labour costs. Since firing costs and payroll taxes account for a large proportion
of overall non-wage labour costs in many countries, they are likely to be used in the future
to boost employment, as they have been extensively used in the past. Our results suggest
that a substantial cut in non-wage labour costs has an important and substantial effect.
Our paper contributes to the small but growing literature that uses large policy changes
within a country over time or across groups to evaluate their labour market effects. Our
analysis makes several advances over previous studies. Unlike many previous studies we
present a taylor-made model that fits the salient features of the policy changes. On the
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empirical side, we provide new evidence on the wage effects of non-wage labour costs, and
additional estimates on the employment effects. The data we use is a unique longitudinal
data set which contains information on individual job histories from social security records
and basic individual information from the census. Thus, we can work with all relevant
job spells instead of quarterly data, as provided for instance by the Labour Force Survey.
We use information on previous unemployment spells to overcome the sample selection
problem we face when estimating the causal effects on wages, which results from those
getting new employment not being a random sample.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next we briefly describe the main
changes brought about by the 1997 Spanish labour market reform, while Section 3 ac-
commodates the salient features of the reform into a matching model with heterogenous
workers. Section 4 explains our identification strategy and section 5 presents the data.
Our main estimation results are reported in Section 6. Finally, section 7, summarises the
main findings of the paper.
2 Institutional background
Employment protection legislation and especially firing costs have undergone substantial
changes in the last twenty five years in Spain. In the early 1990s, nearly one third of
overall employment in Spain was temporary –twice the European average–, and nearly
all new hires signed temporary contracts (Guell and Petrongolo (2007)), which entailed
lower severance payments than permanent contracts when separation took place earlier
than agreed or nil when the termination date was observed, and whose termination could
not be appealed. Such a rapid increase in temporary employment, brought about by
a liberalisation in the use of temporary contracts that took place in 1984, led to a dual
labour market (insider-outsider) and segmentation problems between unstable low-paying
jobs and stable high-paying jobs (Dolado, Garc´ıa-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002)).
In order to increase the share of permanent employment, and after a first unsuccessful
reform in 1994,3 the 1997 reform substantially lowered firing costs for unfair dismissals
3The new regulations introduced with the 1994 reform restricted the use of temporary contracts to
seasonal jobs and tried to reduce dismissal costs for permanent contracts by relaxing the conditions for
’fair’ dismissals of workers under permanent contracts. In particular, the definition of ’fair’ dismissal was
widened by including additional ’economic reasons’ for dismissals. However, as Dolado, Garc´ıa-Serrano,
and Jimeno (2002) point out, in practice, not much changed: employers continued to hire workers under
temporary contracts for all type of jobs —and not only for seasonal jobs—, and judges did not change
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and payroll taxes to newly signed permanent contracts, when the worker belonged to
certain population groups. In particular, severance payments for unfair dismissals were
cut by about 25% and payroll taxes fell between 40 and 90% for new permanent con-
tracts of workers younger than 30 years old, over 45 years old, the long-term unemployed,
women under-represented in their occupations, and disabled workers. We only exploit the
differential treatment by age group, since the long-term unemployed and women under-
represented in their occupations may be self-selected, and disabled workers are a very
distinct group which deserves a separate analysis. In particular, we study newly signed
permanent contracts from unemployment. Conversions of temporary to permanent con-
tracts after the second quarter of 1997 were also promoted with reductions in dismissal
costs and payroll taxes for some population groups —see Appendix Table 9. However,
since the reductions were very similar across age groups, identification of the effects be-
comes less clear-cut and therefore we will not use this group either. Table 1 shows the
principal changes in key provisions introduced by the 1997 reform for the younger and
older workers. Severance payment for targeted groups were reduced from 45 to 33 days’
wages per year of seniority and the maximum time period was reduced by half, from 24
to 12 months. Reductions in payroll tax differ by age group; they fall by 60 and 40% for
older and younger unemployed individuals, respectively for a period of 24 months. After
the first 24 months, a lower payroll tax reduction of 50% is extended indefinitely only for
individuals over 45 years of age.
Social security contribution rebates decreased slightly for newly signed contracts in
1999 and these changes were eventually extended in 2001.4 These further changes in
provisions, though minor, will condition our sample period to one year before and after
the reform, i.e. 1996 and 1998 (see Section 4).
3 A theoretical framework
In order to analyze the wage effects of the 1997 reform, this section uses the matching
model with heterogeneous workers put forth by Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2007) with
their behaviour when appraising dismissals, despite the new regulations, i.e. dismissals under ’economic
reasons’ continued to be granted mainly when there was agreement between employers and workers, so
labour courts continued to rule most dismissals as unfair.
4In particular, payroll taxes were reduced 35% in the first year and 25% in the second year for
newly hired young unemployed workers under permanent contract, while reductions for older unemployed
workers were 45% for the first year and 40% for the second one. Dismissal costs, however, did not change
in 1999.
5
Table 1: Principal Changes in Dismissal Cost and Payroll Tax due to the Labour
Market Reform of 1997 which permit identification for Unemployed Workers
Dismissal cost under
existing permanent
contracts (pre-reform)
Dismissal cost under
new permanent
contracts (post-reform)
Payroll tax reductions
for newly hired workers
under permanent
contracts after 1997
Treated
groups
Young
(<30 years)
45 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 42 months’
wages
33 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 24 months’
wages
40% of employer
contribution for 24
months
Older
(>45 years)
45 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 42 months’
wages
33 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 24 months’
wages
60% of employer
contribution for 24
months, 50% thereafter
Control
group
Middle-aged
(30-45 years)
45 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 42 months’
wages
45 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 42 months’
wages
None
two extensions. First, we illustrate the joint effects of payroll taxes and firing costs on
wages. Second, since there are important differences in age between the two targeted
groups of workers (less than 30 years and more than 45 years old, respectively), we
introduce an exogenous job retirement probability in the model.
This labour market consists of a measure 1 of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers
and a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived firms. Workers and firms discount future
payoffs at a common rate δ and capital markets are perfect. In addition, time is discrete.
There are three type of workers, young (y), middle-age (m) and old (o) workers who
can be either unemployed, employed or retired from the labour market. Every quarter,
a proportion φj of each type of employed worker, j = y,m, o, leaves the labour market,
replaced by and identical number of new workers who flow into the unemployment pool.
Thus, the composition of the workers age population does not change among groups.
We assume that this retirement happens upon reaching a certain age or when physical
conditions do not allow to work any longer (by illness or accident).
There is a time-consuming and costly process of meeting unemployed workers and job
vacancies. As in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we assume that the meeting
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function takes the following form
M(ut, vt) =
utvt
(uϕt + v
ϕ
t )
1/ϕ
, ϕ > 0, (1)
where ut denotes the unemployment rate and vt are vacancies. This constant-return-
to-scale matching function ensures that ratios M(ut, vt)/ut and M(ut, vt)/vt lie between
0 and 1. Due to the CRS assumption they only depend on the vacancy-unemployment
ratio θt. The former represents the probability at which unemployed workers meet jobs,
f(θt) = M(1, 1/θt). Similarly, the latter denotes the probability at which vacancies meet
workers, q(θt) = M(θt, 1). Each period, there is a proportion λ
j
t = u
j
t/ut of each type of
workers looking for jobs.
Firms have a production technology that uses only labour. Each firm consists of only
one type of job which is either filled or vacant. Before a position is filled, the firm has
to open a job vacancy with cost c per period. A firm’s output depends on aggregate
worker’s productivity Ajt and a match-specific term zt. We assume there is a productivity
gap between each type of worker. The match-specific productivity term zt is assumed
to be independent and identically distributed across firms and time, with a cumulative
distribution function G(z) and support [0, z¯].
Firms may voluntarily terminate employment relationships, for which they may incur
in a firing cost. In particular, firms lose γj when a match with a worker is destroyed
by the firm. This cost is assumed to be fully wasted and not a transfer, reflecting firing
restrictions imposed by the government. The second policy parameter is the wage payroll
tax to be paid by the firm, τ j.
The equations characterizing the value of vacancies, Vt, and filled positions, J
j
t (zt)
are,5
5For exposition reasons, we omit writing the aggregate state variables {At, θt} as arguments of these
value functions.
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Vt = −c+ λyt δ
[
q(θt)
∫ z¯
ez
yH
t+1
Jyt+1(z)dG(z) + [1− q(θt)(1−G(z˜yHt+1))]Vt+1
]
+ λmt δ
[
q(θt)
∫ z¯
ez
mH
t+1
Jmt+1(z)dG(z) + [1− q(θt)(1−G(z˜mHt+1 ))]Vt+1
]
+ (1− λyt − λmt )δ
[
q(θt)
∫ z¯
ez
oH
t+1
Jot+1(z)dG(z) + [1− q(θt)(1−G(z˜oHt+1))]Vt+1
]
, (2)
J jt (zt) = A
j
tzt − (1 + τ j)wjt (zt) + δ(1− φj)
[∫ z¯
ez
jD
t+1
J jt+1(z)dG(z) +G(z˜
jD
t+1)
(
Vt+1 − γj
)]
+ δφjVt+1, (3)
where z˜jHt+1 and z˜
jD
t+1, j = {y,m, o}, are match-specific productivity thresholds, defined
such that nonprofitable matches (i.e., with negative surplus) are severed. These thresholds
or reservation productivities must satisfy the following conditions:
J jt (z˜
jH
t )− Vt = 0, (4)
J jt (z˜
jD
t )− Vt + γj = 0. (5)
Expression (4) defines the the reservation productivity associated to the hiring process
of unemployed workers who meet a vacant job. Note that in this case the firm is not
entailed to γ in the absence of agreement since the job has not been created yet. In turn,
(5) defines the reservation productivity for job destruction of existing positions. In this
case, firing costs γ become operational.
It follows that each type of worker separate with probabilities,
sjt = φ
j + (1− φj)G(z˜jDt ). (6)
On the workers’ side, each type of unemployed worker gets bj units of the consumption
good each period, which could be understood as the value of leisure, home production,
or unemployment benefit. Those who are employed earn a wage wjt . The values of the
different statuses - unemployed, U jt and employed, W
j
t (zt) - are given by the following
expressions:
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U jt = b
j + δ
[
f(θt)
∫ z¯
ez
jH
t+1
W jt+1(z)dG(z) + [1− f(θt)(1−G(z˜jHt+1))]Ut+1
]
, (7)
W jt (zt) = w
j
t (zt) + δ
[
(1− φj)
(∫ z¯
ez
jD
t+1
W jt+1(z)dG(z) +G(z˜
jD
t+1)U
j
t+1
)
+ φjRjt+1
]
. (8)
For simplicity, we assume that workers retired only from employment and receive the
same income as unemployed workers (U jt = R
j
t ).
To close the model, we need first to incorporate two additional assumptions. One is
the free entry condition for vacancies: firms will open vacancies until the expected value
of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium we must have
Vt = 0. (9)
The other assumption is that wages are set through Nash bargaining. The Nash
solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the worker’s and firm’s net
return from the job match. The first-order conditions for each type of employees yield
the following condition,
(1− β)(1 + τ j)(W jt (zt)− U jt ) = β(J jt (zt)− Vt + γj). (10)
Defining the total surplus for each type of job as Sjt (zt) = (1 + τ
j)(W jt (zt) − U jt ) +
(J jt (zt)− Vt + γj), and using (2)-(10), the equilibrium wages are
wjt (zt) = (1−β)bj+
β
(1 + τ j)
[
βAjtzt + [1− δ(1− φj)]γj + δf(θt)(1− β)
∫ z¯
ez
jH
t+1
Sjt+1(z)dG(z)
]
,
(11)
where
Sjt (zt) = A
j
tzt − (1 + τ j)(1− β)bj + [1− δ(1− φj)]γj − δf(θt)β
∫ z¯
ez
jH
t+1
Sjt+1(z)dG(z)
+ (1− φj)δ
∫ z¯
ez
jD
t+1
Sjt+1(z)dG(z) (12)
It is immediate to see that direct effects of firing costs γ and pay roll taxes τ go
in opposite direction, so that the overall effect of the 1997 reform on permanent wages
is entirely an empirical question. Payroll taxes decrease wages because they reduce the
net share of the match product obtained by the worker as well as the match surplus
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in next periods. In contrast, job firing costs increase wages because they increase the
workers ‘implicit’ bargaining power. Notice that the higher the labour market exit rate
φ, the higher the effect of firing costs on wages. Thus, the job retirement probability
introduces an extra amplification mechanism on wages in response to non-wage labour
cost adjustments.
To fully characterize the dynamics of this economy, we need to define the law of motion
for unemployment and the mass of employed workers (ujt and n
j
t). These evolve according
to the following difference equations:
njt = n
j
t−1 + f(θt−1)λ
j
t(1−G(z˜jHt ))ujt−1 − sjtnjt−1 (13)
nt = n
y
t + n
m
t + n
o
t (14)
ujt = u
j
t−1 + s
j
tn
j
t−1 − f(θt−1)λjt(1−G(z˜jHt ))ujt−1, (15)
ut = u
y
t + u
m
t + u
o
t , (16)
1 = ut + nt, (17)
4 Identification strategy
In order to identify the impact of dismissal costs and payroll taxes on wages, we compare
the change in mean wages of young and older employees holding a permanent contract in
the current spell and who were unemployed in the previous spell before and after the 1997
reform, with the change in mean wages of middle age workers who got a permanent job
from unemployment. That is, we exploit the variation over time and across age groups
and use a difference-in-differences estimator. The identifying assumption requires that
the difference between wages of treatment and control groups would not change in the
absence of the reform. More formally,
E{w˜Tpre} − E{w˜Cpre} = E{w˜Tpost} − E{w˜Cpost}
where w˜ is the counterfactual wage in absence of the reform, superscript j = T,C indicates
treatment or control group and subscripts pre and post refer to pre- and post-reform
periods.
10
In the empirical analysis, we identify the average effect of the reform on wages as:
βDID = (E{wTpost} − E{wTpre})− (E{wCpost} − E{wCpre}) (18)
where w is actual wages. The identification strategy is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots
average wages for men and women by age group relative to the second quarter of 1997,
for the years before and after the reform, i.e. 1995 to 1999. Figure 1 shows a marked
change in the growth rate of average wages of the treatment groups, after the reform.
That is, after the second quarter of 1997 average wages of younger and older workers
increase much faster than those of the control group, and the increase is larger for men
and for the older age group.
As treatment and control groups consist of individuals who make a transition from
unemployment to permanent employment, they are likely not to be a random sample
since some individual characteristics may determine the probability of entering permanent
employment from unemployment. We take account of this sample selection problem with
a two-step Heckman type correction, and identify the first step (i.e. the probability of
making a transition to permanent employment from unemployment) with two variables
that characterize the unemployment history of the individual: number of unemployment
spells prior to the transition and unemployment duration over all spells.
We estimate the effect of the reform on wages with the following wage equation:
Wit = α0+α1Dt+α2Di+α31time+α32Di× time+β ′Di×Dt+X ′γ+ δλ+ θi+ it (19)
whereWit is the log of gross monthly wage, Di is a vector of dummies for treated groups
(i.e. workers who make a transition to permanent employment from unemployment and
are aged less than 30 or older than 45 years) and Dt is a vector of dummies that identify
the post-reform years. The variable time is a time-trend, so α31 captures the evolution of
wages over time, the impact of macro shocks affecting wages in both treated and control
groups, while α32 allows for different age-group specific slopes. The vector X includes
time-varying covariates such as education, occupation. The coefficients of interest in this
regression are the βs, which represent the treatment effects; that is, capture the effects of
the reform on wages in the years after the reform. Finally, λ is the selection coefficient,
11
Figure 1: Wage trend for treated and control groups in our sample
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which derives from the following first stage linear probability model:
Pr[eit = 1|Xit] = Λ[µo+µ1Dt+µ2Di+µ31time+µ32Di×time+θ′Di×Dt+X ′γ+Z ′η] (20)
where eit = 1 if individual i transits from unemployment to permanent employment and
eit = 0 otherwise. The vector Z includes the two variables that help identify this first
step regression, that is, the number of unemployment spells prior to the transition and
unemployment duration over all spells.
Our strategy assumes that employers do not substitute workers not affected by the
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reform for targeted workers. However, if the change in provisions brought about by
the reform is perceived as beneficial by employers, they will tend to substitute non-
targeted workers (our control group) for targeted workers (our treatment group) who
are otherwise deemed similar. To see whether the assmumption holds, Table 2 presents
pre- and post-reform employment probabilities for individuals with ages adjacent to the
relevant age thresholds, i.e. 30 and 45 years. If employers substituted workers, pre-
and post-reform employment probabilities for control group workers would fall. Table 2
shows that employment probabilities for these workers do not change significantly, which
suggests that the possible substitution of workers is not likely to affect our results. To
further check whether substitution is a problem we estimate the effects on employment of
the reform with the sample restricted to the narrower defined age treatment and control
groups. Results of these regressions are shown in Table 10 in the Appendix. If substitution
took place then we would find larger effects in the restricted sample. Estimates of Table
10 and Table 8 show that this is not the case: the effects of the reform on employment
probabilities estimated with the restricted sample are quite similar to (and usually slightly
smaller than) the effects obtained with the whole sample.6
Table 2: Pre- and Post-reform employment probabilities for a restricted sample
Men Women
Age Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
27 50.2% 56.0% 45.2% 49.1%
28 53.1% 59.0% 46.7% 50.1%
29 55.0% 62.0% 48.7% 52.1%
30 60.3% 60.5% 51.2% 52.3%
31 62.8% 63.0% 55.9% 55.7%
32 64.0% 63.9% 56.1% 57.2%
42 70.1% 70.7% 65.1% 66.1%
43 71.3% 71.8% 66.3% 66.8%
44 71.2% 71.1% 67.4% 68.0%
45 73.5% 76.3% 67.9% 70.3%
46 73.0% 76.9% 69.3% 74.2%
47 74.1% 79.1% 70.1% 73.6%
6The only exception is the unemployment to permanent employment transition probability of older
women.
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5 Data and methodological decisions
We employ a unique administrative dataset with Social Security records called Countinu-
ous Sample of Job Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL) for the year
2005, which consist of a random sample of 4% of all affiliated workers, working or not, and
pensioners from the Social Security archives. This dataset contains detailed job-related
information on the complete job history of of 1,142,118 individuals, which include labour
market status and type of contract for each and every job spell. The MCVL is very rich
and detailed as regards job histories, but lacks information on basic individual charac-
teristics. To this end, we match the MCVL and municipal information (padrones) and
recover individual information on sex, education and age.
Our sample selection is as follows. First, we study men and women aged between
21-60 to select out the two ends of the labour career. Second, we only use job spells
posterior to 1993, since prior to that year information on type of contract is not reliable.
Third, we drop incomplete or incorrect registers. Forth, we consider workers who are in
the ”Regimen General”, which includes 90 per cent of all workers; i.e. we exclude the
self-employed, workers in Agriculture, Fishing and other minor special cases.7 To avoid
capturing the effects of the 1999 reform, we compare the year prior to the reform (1996)
with the year after the reform (1998). Sensibility checks are performed with slightly wider
time windows (i.e.1995-1996 and 1998-1999), but results do not change substantially (see
Appendix Table 11).
The wage measure is the log of gross monthly wage or salary, deflated by the consumer
price index.
Tables 3 and 4 provide summary statistics by relevant age groups of our sample for
men and women separately. Descriptive statistics are presented for the period before
and after the 1997 Reform. The last three rows suggest that the probability of getting a
permanent contract or to make a transition from temporary to permanent employment
might have increased after the reform and especially so for the youngest age group. In
the Appendix A.1 we investigate whether such figures can be taken at face value or, on
the contrary, are rather misleading.
The matched MCVL has important advantages over other data sets which have been
7This is common practice in the few studies that use the MCVL (e.g. Garc´ıa-Pe´rez and Rebollo-Sanz
(2009)) and is also the choice of Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002) when studying the employment
effects of the reform using the Spanish Labour Force Survey.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group, Pre- and Post-Reform for Men
Variable Age<30 Age 30-45 Age>45
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Wages 1017.33 1138.80 1308.47 1397.11 1399.34 1548.18
Log wages 6.925 7.048 7.177 7.242 7.240 7.345
Age 25.15 24.96 36.57 36.15 51.94 52.25
% Incomplete Primary Education 12.80 16.07 21.59 25.84 45.18 50.12
% Primary Education 43.47 45.68 35.50 39.42 28.24 28.12
% Secondary and Technical Education 37.19 32.89 35.55 28.65 20.47 17.09
% University 6.54 5.37 7.36 5.99 6.01 4.68
% with Permanent Contract 43.89 53.28 75.54 76.69 82.07 83,81
% with Transitory Contract 56.11 46.67 24.46 23.28 18.93 16.19
Unemployment spells 4.54 4.66 3.24 3.67 2.35 2.75
Unemployment duration 1017.63 897.64 1123.21 1075.13 1409.93 1228.51
N 26,443 70,394 49,950 102,144 26,973 50,867
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group, Pre- and Post-Reform for Women
Variable Age<30 Age 30-45 Age>45
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Wages 987.55 1045.78 1305.56 1399.76 1377.76 1401.76
Log wages 6.90 6.95 7.17 7.24 7.23 7.25
Age 24.94 24.93 36.28 35.97 51.76 51.70
% Incomplete Primary Education 7.98 8.22 19.3 18.10 49.52 48.85
% Primary Education 33.57 33.98 35.15 35.62 28.22 31.06
% Secondary and Technical Education 47.80 47.04 35.66 36.06 17.16 15.55
% University 10.65 10.76 9.89 10.21 5.1 4.55
% with Permanent Contract 40.38 41.81 67.35 70.49 70.79 73,52
% with Transitory Contract 59.62 58.19 32.65 29.51 29.21 26.48
Unemployment spells 4.90 4.97 3.83 4.08 2.90 3.32
Unemployment duration 1071.63 942.17 1224.94 1163.55 1517.24 1362.98
N 30,886 118,854 34,969 103,510 10,940 28,602
employed in previous studies. For instance, as compared with the Spanish Labour Force
Survey (Encuesta de Poblacio´n Activa, EPA), used by Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz
(2002) to examine the effects of the reform on employment, the MCVL contains infor-
mation on wages for each job spell, which allows us to examine the effects on wages, for
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first time. Secondly, the MCVL provides information on each and every single job spell
and not only at the time of the interview, as typically occurs with other large and rep-
resentative surveys such as the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), the EU
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), or the Labour Force Surveys, which
eliminates the possibility of aggregation bias. The time-span of the MCVL, however, is
not long enough as to cover more than one economic cycle, and thus cycle effects cannot
be taken account of in the empirical analysis.
6 Wage Effects of the 1997 Reform
As pointed out in the Introduction, we present two sets of complementary evidence on
the effects of the 1997 reform. We first present short-term microeconometric estimates
(Section 6.1) and then longer-term evidence which results from calibrating and simulating
the model of Section 3 (Section 6.2). Simulations will also allow us to calculate the
separate effect of dismissal costs and payroll taxes.
The distinction between short-term and long-term effects is the following: While the
difference-in-difference estimates only capture the first year effects of the 1997 reform,
the simulation of our theoretical model predicts the cumulative impact when all workers
belonging to the treatment population groups are directly affected by the reform. That
is, simulated long-term effects assume that the new levels of firing costs and payroll taxes
apply to all employed workers in the treatment groups, and not only to newly signed
permanent contracts.
6.1 Short-term micreconometric estimates
Table 5 reports the estimates of interest of the wage equation (19) in the upper panel
and of the selection equation (20) in the lower panel, for men and women separately.
The effect of the reform on wages is captured by the coefficients β on the interaction
(Di×Dt), which is positive and statistically significant for the two treatment groups and
both genders. This means that the reduction in dismissal costs and payroll taxes results
in a sizeable wage increase for the two treated groups as compared to the control group.
The increase is larger for the older group than for the younger one and smaller for women
than for men. More precisely, we find a 4.6% wage increase for young unemployed men
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transiting to permanent contract; the increase for women of the same age is lower (2.5%).
For the older unemployed workers doing the same transition, wages increase an 8% and
6% for men and women, respectively.
Table 5: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Wage equation
Age<30 -0.328 -32.01 -0.251 -18.98
Age>45 0.063 5.11 0.047 2.42
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.046 3.37 0.025 2.54
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.078 4.63 0.061 2.57
Selection coeff (λ) 23.655 5.27 1.173 18.5
Selection equation
Age<30 -0.080 -11.14 -0.127 -13.89
Age>45 -0.034 -3.99 0.041 2.95
(Age<30)*Reform 0.042 4.53 0.014 3.25
(Age>45)*Reform 0.053 13.62 0.021 8.39
Unemployment spells -0.015 -31.01 -0.009 -17.65
Duration -0.0001 -24.54 -0.0001 -30.70
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years.
Controls have the expected sign. For instance, age dummies (Di) show a monotonic
and positive relationship between age and wages. Full estimates of the wage and selection
regressions are shown in Appendix Table 12.
Selection into the relevant transition from unemployment to permanent employment
is indeed not random, but positive, i.e. unobservables are positively correlated with both
doing the transition and wages, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant δ.
The two coefficients of the variables that identify selection into the relevant transition η
are negative and statistically significant. That is, a larger number of unemployment spells
or longer overal time in unemployment reduces the probability of signing a permanent
contract from unemployment.
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6.2 Long-term effects: Calibration and simulated results of the
model
In this section we quantify the cumulative impact in relative wages when all workers of
each target group are assumed to be directly affected by the reform. To this end, we
first calibrate the model presented in section 3 at quarterly frequencies just before the
1997 labour market reform. Then we departure from the initial setup by reproducing
the observed reduction in firing costs and payroll tax in the targeted age-groups during
the 1997 reform. Finally, we analyze the simulated long-term post reform effects on the
level of wages of each target group with respect to the non targeted group of workers
(m). Thus, the simulated results complement the short-run estimated effects presented
in section 6.1 by predicting the long-term impact on wages.
6.2.1 Benchmark calibration: Before the reform
Our benchmark parametrization must match the following targets in the steady state,
which are summarized in the upper part of Table 6. The first three targets consist of the
average unemployment rates for workers with less than 30 years old, uy = 34.7%, between
30 and 45 years old, um = 18.0%, and more than 45 years old, uo = 12.3%. We also target
the wage differential among these groups. Thus, wy/wm = 0.777 and wo/wm = 1.070.
With respect to the calibration of our parameters, we set the discount factor δ = 0.99,
which implies a reasonable quarterly interest rate of nearly 1 percent. The workers’
bargaining power β is set to 0.5. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) identify an elasticity
of unemployment with respect to the matching function in the range 0.5-0.7. We take 0.5
as reference and thus set the matching parameter ϕ at 0.552.
In Spain the standard age of retirement is 65, although retirement at earlier ages is
common due to disability. In Spain, the average age for those workers older than 45 years
was around 54 in 1996. In turn, Blanco (2000) estimates an exit probability of 0.04 from
employment due to job retirement and disability for workers near this age. Thus, we
set φo = 0.040. Moreover, using data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics
(INE), we calculate a quarterly exit rate from employment of 1.8% for young workers
and 1.2% for middle age employees due to illness or accident. So, the labour market
exit probability for these two age-groups are φy = 0.018 and φm = 0.012, respectively.
Following Benito and Hernando (2008) we set the payroll tax at 0.27 for all groups. Thus,
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Table 6: Benchmark Calibration. Spain, 1996
Value Source
Targets:
Unemployment rate (< than 30 years old) uy 0.347 [A]
Unemployment rate between 30 and 45 years old um 0.180 [A]
Unemployment rate > than 45 years old uo 0.123 [A]
Wage gap for young workers w
y
wm
0.777 [A]
Wage gap for old workers w
0
wm
1.070 [A]
Parameters:
Aggregate labour productivity > than 45 years old Ao 1.000 Normalized
Aggregate labour productivity between 30 and 45 Am 0.90 [C]
Aggregate labour productivity < than 30 years old Ay 0.695 [C]
Mean of log z µ 0.000 Normalized
Standard deviation of log z σz 0.20 [D]
Discount rate δ 0.990 [A]
Exogenous retirement probability > than 45 years old φo 0.040 [B]
Exogenous retirement probability between 30 and 45 φm 0.012 [A]
Exogenous retirement probability < than 30 years old φy 0.018 [A]
Employment opportunity cost < than 30 years old by 0.549 [C]
Employment opportunity cost between 30 and 45 bm 0.691 [C]
Employment opportunity cost > than 45 years old bo 0.228 [C]
Employers payroll tax τ j 0.270 [B]
Cost of vacancy c 0.030 [C]
Parameter of the Matching function ϕ 0.552 [D]
Worker’s bargaining power β 0.50 [D]
Firing tax parameter < than 30 years old γy 0.26wy [A,B]
Firing tax parameter between 30 and 45 γm 0.87wm [A,B]
Firing tax parameter > than 45 years old γo 1.78wo [A,B]
Note: [A] Own calculation based on original data; [B] Other studies;
[C] Obtained from model to match the targets; [D] Own assumption
19
τ y = τm = τ o = 0.27.
Next we turn to the firing costs γj. We first estimate the total severance payments
(SP j) for permanent contracts using the following information from Osuna (2005): (i) 20
days of wages per year of seniority for legal indemnities in fair dismissals with a maximum
of 12 monthly wages; (ii) 45 days of wages per year of seniority for unfair dismissals with
a maximum of 42 monthly wages dismissals; (iii) the mean job tenure Xj for each worker-
age group; (iv) procedural wages of around two monthly wages; and (v) the fact that
72% of all firing processes were declared unfair in 1996. In turn, Garibaldi and Violante
(2005) estimate a tax component between 19% and 34% of total firing costs, depending on
the layoff scenario. We consider the most conservative of these scenarios and set it equal
to 20%. Thus, the firing tax component amounts to near 24% of severance payments.
According to Garc´ıa-Serrano and Jimeno (1999), the average job tenure in 1996 was one
year for employees younger than 25 years, 7 years for those workers between 25 and 45
years, and 16 years for employees older than 45 years old. Thus, the firing tax components
for each group of worker amounts to γy = 0.26×wy, γm = 0.87×wm and γo = 1.78×wo.8
Following the standard assumption in the literature, as in den Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (2000), the idiosyncratic productivity zt is assumed to be log-normally distributed
with mean µ and standard deviations σz. We normalize the mean of log zt to zero, µ = 0.
With respect to σz, the literature provides a range of values between 0.1 (den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000)) and 0.4 (Trigari (2004)) and we choose an intermediate case,
σz = 0.2. See also Burgess and Turon (2005); and Walsh (2005), who use values within
this range. We also normalized the aggregate labour productivity for the group of workers
with more than 45 years old, Ao = 1.00, and fix Ay = 0.695 and Am = 0.90 to match the
observed wage gap among these workers.
Finally, the hiring cost c is calibrated together with the employment opportunity
costs bj. We select these parameters such that in the steady-state job creation is equal to
job destruction and equilibrium satisfies our remaining calibration targets: uy = 34.7%,
um = 18.0%, uo = 12.3%. This yields c = 0.030, by = 0.549, bm = 0.691 and bo = 0.228.
8For Xj years of job tenure severance payments in days are SP j=0.72×Xj×45 days per year +
0.28×Xj×20 days per year + 60 days. Thus, the quarterly firing tax calculation amounts to γj =
SP j
90 × 0.24× wj .
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Table 7: Simulated effects on wages of the 1997 reform
The 1997 reform wy/wm wo/wm
Before the reform 0.777 1.070
After the reform 0.841 1.233
Simulated variation (%) 8.24 15.23
Estimated short-term post reform variation.
First panel of Table 5 (%) 4.63 7.78
No reduction in τ
Before the reform 0.777 1.070
After the reform (modified) 0.779 1.063
Variation (%) 0.26 -0.65
6.2.2 Long-term wage effects
The first principal change in legislation reduced severance payments by around 20% (33
days of wages per year of seniority, with a maximum of 24 monthly wages, rather than 45
days of wages per year of seniority with a maximum of 42 monthly wages in case of unfair
dismissal). Thus, the firing tax parameters for workers under 30 and over 45 years of age
and with new permanent contracts can be reduced to γy = 0.238×wy and γo = 1.413×wo,
respectively.9 Since the reform did not change severance payments in the middle aged
group, their firing tax component remains unchanged. Thus, γm = 0.87× wm.
The second main modification of the reform was a reduction of 40% and 60% in the
payroll tax for workers under 30 and over 45 years of age, respectively. Thus, τ y and τ o
are reduced from 0.27 to 0.16 and 0.11, respectively while τm remains unchanged at 0.27.
This simulation takes into account the changes experienced by wages in terms of the
steady-state values. The results of this exercise are displayed in the first panel of Table 7.
The simulated reform yields an increase in the relative wage of the two target groups,
9For i = y, o, the calculations are: SP i=0.72×XXi years×33 days per year + 0.28×XXi years×20
days per year + 60 days. Thus, the quarterly firing tax calculation amounts to γi = SP
i
90 × 0.24× wi
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which is larger for workers older than 65 years. The simulated ratios wo/wm and wy/wm
are increased by 15.23% and 8.24%, respectively. These results are in line with the
estimated shorter-term effects reported in section 6.1. Moreover, the simulated post
reform scenario yields larger longer term effects than the estimated short term results.
For instance, the estimated short-term wage effect for young unemployed men who do
a transition to permanent contract is a wage increase of around 5% during the reform
period relative to their middle-aged counterpart, while for older unemployed men who do
the same transition wages increase around 8% (see Table 5).
Since our simulated model captures the total cumulative effects of the reform, we can
say that, during the first year of the reform, the estimated increase in the relative wages
of young and old workers accounts for over half of the predicted long-term effects – 56
and 51 percent respectively. The partial transmission of the adjustment in the non-wage
labour costs occurs because the estimated short-term causal effects pick up the effect of
the change in provisions for newly signed permanent contracts, whereas the simulations
capture the effects that would obtain if the change in provisions affected all employed
workers belonging to the treatment groups. Recall that it is not possible to identify and
estimate the mid- and long term effects of the 1997 reform because in 1999 a new labour
market reform was introduced in Spain. Thus, the long-term effects of the reform can
only be predicted through the simulation of the theoretical model.
The simulation also permits to separately identify and quantify the effects of each
policy change. That is, we can compute the impact of changing either firing costs or
payroll taxes. To calculate the impact of reducing solely firing costs, we simulate a
scenario with no reduction in payroll taxes (i.e. τy = τm = τo = 0.27), keeping the rest of
post-reform parameters constant The results of this exercise are presented in the bottom
panel of Table 7. According to our model (see equation 11), the direct effect of job firing
costs increases wages because these costs increase the workers implicit bargaining power.
That is, in the absence of an indirect effect, we should expect a reduction in the wages of
treated groups due to the reduction of severance payments. In contrast, our findings show
that the (overall) effect of firing costs on wages is nil, suggesting that the indirect effects
offset the direct effects of firing costs. An immediate corolary of this finding is that the
increase in relative wages of young and older workers with respect to middle aged workers
is mostly accounted for by the large reduction in payroll taxes.
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7 Final remarks
This paper provides short- and long-term empirical evidence of the effect on wages of
two important elements of non-wage labour costs, using a labour market reform in Spain
which reduced firing costs and payroll taxes after 1997 for certain population subgroups.
To gain a theoretical insight into the effects of these two provisions we extend the
matching model with heterogeneous workers (Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2007)) to
accommodate the salient features of the reform. Our model predicts an ambiguous effect
on wages, since the effect of firing costs and payroll taxes go in opposite directions. Firing
costs are expected to increase wages, through their increased bargaining power of workers,
while the effect of payroll taxes is negative.
For the empirical analysis we use a unique longitudinal data set, which contains in-
formation on individual job histories from social security records and basic individual
characteristics from the census. Since we have information on each and every single job
spell, we avoid the possibility of aggregation bias.
Our empirical strategy exploits the substantial reduction in firing costs and payroll
taxes brought about by the 1997 Spanish labour market reform for young and old workers
who got a permanent job from unemployment. Since the changes did not cover all workers,
we use a difference-in-difference estimator to obtain short-term causal effects. The possible
sample selection bias that arises because firing cost and labour tax reductions apply only
to workers transiting from unemployment to permanent employment is addressed with
a two-step Heckman correction model. The first step of the model is identified with
information on previous unemployment spells. Identification of the causal effects of the
reform may be threatened if employers substitute workers not affected by the reform
for targeted workers. We show that substitution of workers does not take place. Our
estimates suggest that decreased firing costs and payroll taxes have a positive effect on
wages (and also on unemployment). We find larger effects for older than for younger
workers and for men than for women.
The long-term evidence comes from calibrating the model and simulating the reform,
and shows the cumulative effect in the hyopothetical scenario where the reduced firing
costs and payroll taxes affect all employed workers in the treatment groups, rahter than
only newly signed permanent contracts. Simulated long-term effects are larger than esti-
mated short-run ones, and their comparison shows that about 50 percent of the predicted
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cumulative increase on wages takes place during the first year of the reform. Finally, our
simulations also show that the increase in wages is mostly due to the reduction in payroll
taxes, and that the overall effect of firing costs is nil because direct and indirect effects of
firing costs offset each other.
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A Appendix
A.1 Employment Effects of the Reform
Although the paper focuses on wage effects we also evaluate the impact on employment.
Employment effects are interesting per se –e.g. the main objective of the reform was to
promote permanent employment– and also allow us to compare our results with previous
studies that use survey quarterly data (LFS) instead of administrative records on job
spells. To this end, we compare the change in employment probabilities before and after
the reform of treated and control groups. That is we estimate a linear probability model
similar to (20), where now eit = 1 if the individual is employed with a permanent contract
and eit = 0 otherwise. As for the wage equation (19), the θs capture the employment
effects of the reform in the years after the reform for the two treatment groups.
The upper panel of Table 8 reports probit marginal effects estimates using equation 20
to assess whether the reduction in dismissal costs and payroll taxes increased permanent
employment. The results show a positive effect of the reform on permanent employ-
ment probabilities for younger and older male and female workers relative to middle-aged
workers. The effect is larger for the younger than for the older: permanent employment
probabilities increased by 2.5% for the older (both men and women) and by 4.5% and 3%
for younger men and women, respectively. Our estimates are similar to those reported
by Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002), who examine employment effects of the reform
with LFS data. They also find positive but smaller positive effects for younger workers
(of roughly half our size), but insignificant effects for older workers. The discrepancy may
be explained by the nature of the data sets (the MCVL being administrative records and
including all job spells while the LFS being quarterly survey data) and the cyclical effects,
which we do not control for.
The lower panel of Table 8 shows results for flows from unemployment to permanent
employment. Now the dependent variable of equation (20) takes the value of one if
the individual does the transition from unemployment to permanent employment and
zero otherwise. The results show increased transitions from unemployment to permanent
employment of younger and older workers relative to middle-aged workers, as result of
the reform. Such increase is now larger for older workers: transitions increased by 2% and
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1.6% for men and women, while for youger workers the increase was about 0.6%.10
Table 8: Employment and Transition Probabilities for Men and Women
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
Permanent Employment
Age < 30 -0.307 51.43 -0.235 -97.20
Age > 45 -0.168 54.75 0.147 32.85
(Age < 30) × (Post 1997) 0.047 15.72 0.031 9.68
(Age > 45) × (Post 1997) 0.025 6.76 0.024 4.75
N 650,674 355,578
Log-likelihood -356,480.69 -238,122.44
Unemployment to Permanent Employment
Age < 30 -0.008 -8.18 -0.019 -14.95
Age > 45 -0.002 2.60 -0.015 6.70
(Age < 30) × (Post 1997) 0.006 4.31 0.007 4.17
(Age > 45) × (Post 1997) 0.020 9.47 0.016 5.61
N 398,333 226,333
Log-likelihood -168,989.81 -110,478.41
Notes: The Table reports probit marginal effects. Control group are individuals
aged 30 to 45 years.
10As compared to Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002), our estimated effects on this transition are
smaller for younger workers but larger for older workers (theirs being not statistically significant). How-
ever, Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002) examine a different transition, which includes out of the labour
market as well as unemployment as origin state of the transition.
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A.2 Main changes in dismissal costs and payroll taxes Due to
the 1997 Reform for temporary workers
Table 9: Principal Changes in Dismissal Cost and Payroll Tax due to the Labour
Market Reform of 1997 which permit identification for Temporary Contracts
Dismissal cost under
existing permanent
contracts (pre-reform)
Dismissal cost under
new permanent
contracts (post-reform)
Payroll tax reductions
for newly hired workers
under permanent
contracts after 1997
Treated
group
Older
(>45 years)
45 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 42 months’
wages
33 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 24 months’
wages
60% of employer
contribution for 24
months, 50% thereafter
Control
group
Young and
Middle-aged
(≤45 years)
45 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 42 months’
wages
33 days’ wages per year
of seniority with a
maximum of 24 months’
wages
50% of employer
contribution for 24
months
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A.3 Do employers replace non-targeted for targeted workers?
Table 10: Employment and Transition Probabilities for Men and Women (restricted sam-
ple)
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat.
Permanent Employment
Age < 30 -0.191 -53.49 -0.141 -33.41
Age > 45 0.146 17.37 0.111 9.29
(Age < 30) × (Post 1997) 0.034 4.82 0.029 3.53
(Age > 45) × (Post 1997) 0.021 2.63 0.021 3.11
N 221,173 145,319
Log-likelihood -128,614.63 -87,306.55
Unemployment to Permanent Employment
Age < 30 -0.006 -8.09 -0.012 -5.62
Age > 45 -0.004 -2.58 -0.014 -3.00
(Age < 30) × (Post 1997) 0.005 4.39 0.006 3.11
(Age > 45) × (Post 1997) 0.017 10.22 0.028 3.93
N 68,173 46,324
Log-likelihood -58,997.51 -37,683.79
Notes: The Table reports probit marginal effects estimated on a sample of individ-
uals aged 27 to 32 years and 42 to 47 years.
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A.4 Sensibility checks with wider time windows (2 years)
Table 11: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment (95-96 vs 98-99)
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Wage equation
Age<30 -0.303 -11.17 -0.221 -8.98
Age>45 0.116 4.54 0.037 2.47
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.031 3.97 0.026 2.65
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.068 4.72 0.059 3.66
Selection coeff (λ) 21.771 5.63 2.284 19.5
Selection equation
Age<30 -0.285 -12.25 -0.215 -7.23
Age>45 -0.131 -4.88 0.027 4.84
(Age<30)*Reform 0.026 5.42 0.025 3.36
(Age>45)*Reform 0.053 14.73 0.047 7.34
Unemployment spells -0.020 -32.22 -0.011 -18.54
Duration -0.002 -14.64 -0.001 -29.60
Notes: All coefficients are significant at 5%. Control group are men and women
aged 30 to 45 years.
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A.5 Full estimates of wage and selection regressions
Table 12: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Wage equation
Age<30 -0.328 -32.01 -0.251 -18.98
Age>45 0.063 5.11 0.047 2.42
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.046 3.37 0.025 2.54
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.078 4.63 0.061 2.57
(a)Education
Unknown 0.139 4.70 0.050 1.34
Primary incomplete 0.038 1.28 0.194 5.22
Secondary incomplete 0.215 7.24 0.404 10.84
Secondary completed 0.253 6.94 0.522 12.68
Graduate 0.550 16.84 0.702 17.32
Postgraduate and doctorate 0.662 11.69 0.888 13.96
(b)Occupation
Agriculture and Fish Emp. 0.117 9.53 0.406 2.90
Extractive industry 0.290 11.47 0.716 5.64
Alimentary industry 0.420 12.59 0.985 7.64
Plant and machine operatives 0.997 8.85 0.694 5.37
Administrative employees 0.986 8.78 0.584 4.62
Transport employees 0.997 9.48 0.809 6.37
Education and sanitary emp. 0.852 8.14 0.523 4.14
Other social activities 0.349 7.50 0.631 4.98
Professional 0.916 3.09 0.395 3.10
Selection coeff (λ) 23.655 5.27 1.173 18.5
Selection equation
Age<30 -0.080 -11.14 -0.127 -13.89
Age>45 -0.034 -3.99 0.041 2.95
(Age<30)*Reform 0.042 4.53 0.014 3.25
(Age>45)*Reform 0.053 13.62 0.021 8.39
Unemployment spells -0.015 -31.01 -0.009 -17.65
Duration -0.0001 -24.54 -0.0001 -30.70
(a)Education
Unknown 0.005 0.26 0.038 0.68
Primary incomplete 0.013 0.70 0.018 0.46
Secondary incomplete 0.062 3.22 0.012 0.95
Secondary completed 0.105 4.39 0.027 3.84
Graduate 0.211 9.83 0.107 5.70
Postgraduate and doctorate 0.266 6.91 0.254 4.79
(b)Occupation
Agriculture and Fish Emp. 0.336 4.40 0.443 5.06
Extractive industry 0.377 5.16 0.414 3.17
Alimentary industry 0.375 5.11 0.265 1.18
Plant and machine operatives 0.075 1.03 0.099 4.21
Administrative employees 0.465 6.37 0.344 1.82
Transport employees 0.301 4.12 0.150 0.20
Education and sanitary emp. 0.075 1.02 0.017 0.23
Other social activities 0.011 0.15 0.019 2.31
Professional 0.322 4.39 0.210 2.55
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years.
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